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Abstract
I develop a Schumpeterian model where the engine of growth is in the micro-
economic structure of the patent races and derive new results on the determinants of
growth. Under decreasing marginal productivity in the R&D sector, the equilibrium is
characterized by small ﬁrms investing too little and the growth process is dynamically
ineﬃcient; the optimal policy for innovation always implies R&D subsidies. When
the incumbent monopolists are leaders in the patent races, they engage in large R&D
investment and their persistent leadership enhances growth. Other sources of growth
may reduce investment inducing a paradoxical negative correlation between growth
and R&D spending even if innovations are the main engine of growth. In the open
economy, growth is driven by the largest country and increases with its relative size
and openness. In a monetary economy, price stickiness induces an inverted U relation
between inﬂa t i o na n dl o n gr u ng r o w t h .
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Joseph Harrington, Greg Mankiw, Kresimir Zigic and participants to seminars at Harvard,
MIT, CERGE (Prague), University of Milan, EUI (Florence), University of Vienna, CRESSE
Conferences in Corf` u, ICT Conference in Paris and the University of Virginia where these
ideas were presented. Contact:U n i v e r s i t ` a degli Studi di Milano, Bicocca - Piazza dell’Ateneo
Nuovo 1, U6-360. E-mail: federico.etro@unimib.it.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The search for proﬁts is what provides the incentives to invest and ultimately
drives the economy. The new growth theory, starting with the works of Romer
[1990] and Aghion and Howitt [1992]), has exploited this old Schumpeterian idea
to formalize the link between innovation and long run growth. In this paper,
I try to open the “black box” of the engine of growth, investigating its micro-
economic organization in a more general and realistic way and examining the
impact on investments in innovation of important factors like R&D policy, other
sources of growth, globalization and monetary policy. This allows derivation of
a number of new empirical predictions on the determinants of long run growth.
In the endogenous growth literature, investments for innovations are usu-
ally described in a very simple and empirically arguable way: the production
function of new ideas is characterized by constant marginal productivity and a
simple no-arbitrage condition pins down the equilibrium investment and, con-
s e q u e n t l y ,t h er a t eo fe c o n o m i cg r o w t h .This “minimalistic” approach does not
allow to characterize the number and size of the ﬁrms investing in R&D, the re-
lation between incumbent patentholders and outsiders and the eﬀect of realistic
R&D policies.
As noticed by Kortum [1993], Griliches [1994]), Cohen and Klepper [1996])
and other empirical works, investments in R&D are characterized by relevant
ﬁxed costs, decreasing marginal productivity at the ﬁrm level,2 and wasteful du-
plications of resources between ﬁrms due to congestion reasons at the industry
level. Hence, I introduce fully ﬂedged “patent races” with the ﬁrst two features
in a Schumpeterian model due to Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1995] and derive
the drastic consequences associated with the ineﬃciency in the market for in-
novation. Its organization is now characterized by a bias toward small ﬁrms
investing too little in R&D. This ineﬃciency is ampliﬁed in the growth process,
which becomes dynamically ineﬃcient, in the sense that a country could in-
crease its long run growth without reducing current consumption or viceversa
increase consumption without reducing growth. Hence, contrary to the ambigu-
ous results in the literature, the optimal R&D policy requires always subsidizing
R&D.
Another important stylized fact about R&D investment is that a large part
of it is done by dominant ﬁrms producing with the leading edge technologies.3
2One of the stilyzed facts pointed out by Cohen and Klepper [1996] is that the number of
patents and innovations per dollar of R&D decreases with the level of R&D and this is well
grounded empirically (see references cited there).
3For related and updated research on this topic see the International Think-tank on In-
novation and Competition (www.intertic.org). For recent surveys of related theoretical and
e m p i r i c a la d v a n c e so nc o m p e t i t i o na n dg r o w t hs e eA g h i o na n dG r i ﬃth [2005] and Faini et al.
2As a recent Economic Focus of the Economist (May 22nd, 2004) put it, “many
product innovations, in industries from razor blades to software, are made by
companies that have a dominant share of the market. Most mainstream econo-
mists, however, have had diﬃculty explaining why this might be so. Kenneth
Arrow, a Nobel prize-winner, once posed the issue as a paradox. Economic
theory says that a monopolist should have far less incentive to invest in creat-
ing innovations than a ﬁrm in a competitive environment: experience suggests
otherwise. How can this be so?”. Following Etro [2004], I provide a rationale
for investment by the patentholders based on their leadership and free entry
in sequential patent races.4 This paper goes beyond my previous research,
where I sketched a dynamic model without solving it analytically, and provides
new dynamic programming techniques to analytically solve for the equilibrium
growth path and the endogenous value of technological leadership. Investment
by incumbent patentholders leads to persistence of monopolies which in turn
increases the value of developing a new technology: this is not just the value of
the corresponding ﬂow of proﬁts (as traditionally in the literature), but that one
together with the option value to a persistent monopolistic position. The new
element increases the incentives to invest mostly for the monopolists but also for
the outsiders, and hence it speeds up the growth process. In particular, when
marginal productivity of R&D is constant (or close to constant), monopolists
deter entry in the patent race remaining the only innovators, while in the more
realistic case of decreasing marginal productivity, monopolists allow entry but
still invest more than the outsiders.5 This characterization of growth driven by
dominant ﬁrms may help to explain the persistence of technological leadership
especially for large corporations in high-tech sectors.
The framework developed in this paper allows to explore how diﬀerent factors
and policies can aﬀect the engine of growth. I examine some of them deriving
new results on the determinants of growth and new empirical predictions which
could be analyzed in future research.
First, I augment the model with another generic source of growth, which
[2006].
4Blundell et al. [1999] provide evidence from recent high-tech sectors which is consistent
with this thesis. In a similar vein, Nicholas [2003] studies 1920s America and shows that
“ﬁrms with high levels of market power tended to innovate more because they had strong
incentives to do so pre-emptively”. Ogilvie [2004] provides a broader hystorical perspective
on the relationship between barriers to entry and innovation based on our approach.
5In a related paper, Segerstrom [2006] has developed a model where incumbent monopolists
invest in R&D because they can use a diﬀerent innovation technology from the one adopted
by the other ﬁrms. This approach basically assumes cost advantages in the innovation activity
for the monopolists and allows to study their persistence, but it does not explain its ultimate
source. See also Denicol` o and Zanchettin [2006].
3may just be a traditional exogenous technological progress or it may be micro-
founded in some endogenous way. This allows to show a surprising result: an
increase in growth due to other sources may reduce the incentives to innovate.
Consequently, even if innovation is the main engine of growth (in the sense that
it actually contributes to most of the growth rate), growth and investment in
innovation may be negatively correlated (over time or across countries). This
result is due to the increase in the interest rate associated with higher growth
which may crowd out some ﬁrms from the innovation sector: this happens when
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is low enough. Such a result suggests
that empirical tests of Schumpeterian growth theories should not look at the
simple correlation between growth and R&D investment, but would need to
separate the direct positive eﬀect of innovation on growth from the feedback
eﬀe c to fg r o w t ho ni n n o v a t i o n .
Then, I consider a open economy version of the model showing that the
technological frontier shifts toward the largest country, which develops a com-
parative advantage in the R&D sector. Even if in a stylized way, the world
equilibrium is consistent with the growth experience of the last decades, and in
particular with large R&D investments and technological progress in the US,
high US imports of ﬁnal goods which allowed other countries to import Amer-
ican technology and absorb its growth, and large capital ﬂows toward the US
ﬁnancing its large current account deﬁcits. The growth rate is positively re-
lated with the degree of openness and it exhibits relative (and not absolute)
scale eﬀects: an increase in the size of the leading economy compared to the
rest of the world enhances growth. Moreover, R&D subsidization is again the
optimal unilateral policy, but for diﬀerent reasons than in a closed economy: it
now allows to provide domestic ﬁrms with a strategic advantage in international
competition for innovations and to conquer a leadership in the world markets,
but without aﬀecting world growth.
Finally, following the new-keynesian tradition [Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 1987;
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 1996; Woodford, 2003] and in particular a recent contribu-
tion by Barro and Tenreyro [2006], I extend the model to a monetary economy
drawing some new implications on the relationship between inﬂation and en-
dogenous growth, a relationship rarely investigated in the recent theoretical
literature. Price stickiness induces an inverted-U relation between inﬂation and
long run growth which is broadly consistent with available empirical evidence:
excessive inﬂation erodes the monopolistic proﬁts of innovators reducing the
aggregate incentives to invest and hence reducing growth. Within this context
we can also derive a rule for optimal monetary policy. When price stickiness is
negligible the optimal monetary rule tends toward a Friedman rule generalized
to take endogenous growth into account. When pirce stickiness is relevant, the
4optimal monetary rule tends toward a price stabilization rule. Finally, this sim-
ple model can be used to provide an alternative newkeynesian framework where
investment and growth are present.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and Sec-
tion 3 solves for the equilibrium organization of the R&D sector and for the
general equilibrium discussing the optimal R&D policy. Section 4 endogenizes
the persistence of monopolies. Section 5 extends the model to consider various
determinants of growth and Section 6 concludes. Technical details are in the
Appendix.
2 The Model






e−ρtdt with γ>0( 1 )
where ρ>0 is the time preference rate. The representative agent earns in-








which holds at each point in time. Using the intertemporal resource constraint,
one can derive an expression for savings depending on the expected value of
income and on the interest rate proﬁle.
Output Y can be used for consumption C, production of intermediate goods
X or investment in R&D activities providing a rate of return r, and it is pro-
duced according to a generalized version of the production function introduced












where A is Total Factor Productivity, L is the ﬁxed labor force, Xj is the inter-
mediate good j of quality κj, which is assumed non-durable for simplicity, N is
the constant number of intermediate goods, q>1a n d0<α≤ θ ≤ 1. It can be
easily veriﬁed that this function satisﬁes constant returns to scale and decreasing
6An advantage of this framework is that technological progress due to innovations realizes
independently for each intermediate good: hence, it allows to think of small and frequent
innovations rather than innovations for general purpose technologies.
5marginal productivity of each input. The parameter α represent the factor share
of income from intermediate goods while 1 − α is the labor share. The para-
meter θ reﬂects the elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs, with
1/(1 − θ) approximating the elasticity of demand for each intermediate good.
In the standard literature, these two parameters are equated setting α = θ,a s
in Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1995], while it is important to keep them separate.
The market for the ﬁnal good, which is the numeraire, and the markets for
labour and credit (to ﬁrms investing in R&D) are perfectly competitive. How-
ever some form of imperfect competition holds in the market for intermediate
goods. Each intermediate good is produced at a unitary marginal cost and sold
by a single producer until a newer version is on the market, which is a reason-
able situation when the rate of creation of new products is fast enough.7 For
instance under both price and quantity competition, when the number of inter-
mediate goods N is high enough (that strategic interactions are negligible), the
equilibrium price of each intermediate good is 1/θ when innovation are drastic.
To be as general as possible, however, I will deﬁne 1 + µ as the price for each
monopolistic producer (so that µ is the mark up). Then, the aggregate quantity




















1−α. Substituting the quantity X(κj) from (4), we obtain the















and the total amount of intermediate goods X = αY/(1 + µ). Since TFP and













To describe the investment side of the economy, we need to describe the
technology to create innovations. When an innovation for an intermediate good
j generates the new quality rung κj, the innovator starts producing with the
cutting-edge technology and obtains a ﬂow of proﬁts µX(kj). At the same
7According to the empirical evidence surveyed by Cohen and Klepper [1996], whether major
or incremental and whether patented or not, innovations grant market advantage “within one
year for many industries and within three years for most ”.
6time the race to ﬁnd out the subsequent innovation begins. To participate, any
ﬁrm i has to pay a ﬁxed cost F(kj) ,w h i c hm a yi n c l u d ea ne n t r yf e es e tb y
the government, and spend a ﬂow of resources zi(kj). Finally, for any unit of
investment, there is a subsidy at rate s ﬁnanced with lump sum taxes.
The technology for the invention of new goods allows for decreasing marginal
productivity at the ﬁrm level. In particular the investment for ﬁrm i gives birth
to the innovation kj according to a Poisson process with arrival rate pi(kj)g i v e n
by a concave function of zi(kj). To obtain closed form solutions, I assume the
following speciﬁcation:
pi(kj)=[ φ(kj)zi(kj)]  (7)
where the function φ(kj)e x p r e s s e sh o wd i ﬃcult is to discover technology kj
and   ∈ (0,1] represents the degree of returns to scale in the innovation sectors
or the elasticity of expected revenue with respect to the ﬂow of investment.
This parameter is unitary in the existent versions of the quality-ladder model,
implying constant marginal productivity - equivalent to constant returns to scale
since there is just one input - in the R&D sector, but empirical research, for
instance by Cohen and Klepper [1996] and Kortum [1993] suggests an elasticity
much smaller than 1.8
T h ea r r i v a lr a t eo fi n n o v a t i o nkj, is the sum of the individual arrival rates
of the n(kj) entrants plus the one of the incumbent, indexed with M, p(κj)=
Pn(kj)
i=1 pi(kj)+pM(kj). Using the properties of Poisson processes in a stan-






where r+p(kj)i sas o r to fe ﬀective discount factor. Moreover, the expected net
proﬁto fe n t r a n ti in the patent race in sector j when the current quality is kj
can be written as:
8Cohen and Klepper [1996] show that “the assumption of diminishing returns to R&D is
well grounded empirically” for a broad sample of industries (from a theoretical point of view,
notice that, while in most of the productive sectors there are good reasons to believe that
doubling the amount of input total production will double, there are no reasons to believe
that doubling the amount of inputs in the R&D activity will double the expected amount of
innovations). Even Aghion and Howitt [1998, Ch.12] accept this as a stylized fact. Kortum
[1993] suggests a range between 0.1 and 0.6 for this elasticity. Segerstrom [2005] assumes that
decreasing returns hold just for the incumbent monopolist, while constant returns to scale
characterize all the other ﬁrms. He solves the model through simulations and assumes   =0 .3
as the average between the values proposed by Kortum.
7Πi(kj)=
[φ(kj)zi(kj)] VM(kj +1 )− (1 − s)zi(kj)
r + p(kj)
− F(kj)( 9 )
where VM(kj + 1) is the value of being monopolist with the next technology
kj+1. Since also the incumbent monopolist with the technology kj can invest to
innovate, we need to consider its objective function, which is given by a Bellman




[φ(kj)zM] VM(kj +1 )− (1 − s)zM
r + p(kj)
+ V (kj) − F(kj)
¾
(10)
where the ﬁxed cost is paid only if zM > 0a n dV (kj) is given by (8). This value
is the core of the engine of growth, because what drives investment and growth
is exactly the attempt to conquer it. In the standard literature, monopolists
do not invest, hence the value of leadership is just the expected proﬁtf r o mt h e
next innovation. However, as we will see later on, monopolists invest when they
have a leadership in the patent race and in that case, the value of the innovation
includes also the option value of a persistent monopoly, which fundamentally
modiﬁes the incentives to do research.
Finally, I assume that new ideas are more diﬃcult to obtain when the scale
of the sector increses, and that the ﬁxed cost is a constant fraction of the
expected cost of production with the new technology φ(kj)=X(κj +1 ) −1 and
F(kj)=η
R ∞
0 X(kj +1 ) e−[r+p(kj+1)]tdt with ζ>0a n dη ∈ (0,µ). I want to
capture the idea that the larger is the scale of expected production of a ﬁrm, the
larger are the costs necessary to discover and develop the associated technology
(construction of prototypes and samples, new assembly lines and training of
workers). These assumptions will deliver a balanced growth path and will avoid
scale eﬀects on the equilibrium growth rate, in line with the last generation of
quality-ladder models - see Jones [1995] and Barro and Sala-i-Martin [2004].
















9Notice that the associated no arbitrage condition under optimal behaviour implies the
standard equivalence between the riskless return rate and the expected return rate from R&D













where the right hand side includes the expected upgrade in the value of being a leader after a
successfull innovation, the expected loss in case of innovation by a competitor and the current
ﬂow of proﬁts net of the investment ﬂow in R&D.







/Q is a weighted average of the probability












Given this set-up, one can study diﬀerent organizations of the market for
innovations.10 In this paper I will consider the traditional Nash case and the
more realistic Stackelberg case, in which the current monopolist has a ﬁrst mover
advantage, with free entry.
3D y n a m i c I n e ﬃciency and R&D Policy
In this section I model competition in the market for innovation in the Nash
fashion. As well known, under free entry the leader does not invest, because its
best strategy is to stay out from the patent race and enjoy the proﬁts from its
current product until a new innovation will make it obsolete. Competition for
innovations is just between outsiders and the scope of this section is to char-
acterize the equilibrium organization of investment - the number of ﬁrms and
the size of their investments - together with the usual macroeconomic variables
and to derive the optimal R&D policy. A complete analysis of the optimal
organization of the R&D sector is in the Appendix.
In each sector, the lack of investment by incumbents implies that the value
of being a monopolist (10) boils down to VM(kj)=V (kj). Each ﬁrm chooses
its investment zi(kj) to maximize (9) taking as given the strategies of the other
ﬁrms, the value of the next innovation and the interest rate, while the free entry
condition sets the expected proﬁts (9) equal to zero providing the equilibrium
number of entrants n(kj). Combining the optimality condition and the free












which is increasing in the subsidy and in the value of the innovation net of the
ﬁxed cost of entry, while it is independent from the interest rate.
Using the endogenous value of innovation (8) and our functional form as-
sumptions in (12) and substituting in the free entry condition, which sets (9)
10A related investigation is present in a work by Zeira [2003]. However, his interest is in
the choice of innovators between simple innovations and more diﬃcult but radical innovations
and across multiple research strategies.
9equal to zero, we can express the probability of innovation as a linearly decreas-
ing function of the interest rate:11
p(kj)=
[φ(kj)z(kj)]
  V (kj +1 )− z(kj)
F(kj)
− r = (13)
=






1− [µ − η]
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 (µ − η)
¯ ζ(1 − s)
¸  ∙
µ −  (µ − η)
η
¸1− 
− r for any kj
where ¯ ζ = ζ(1 + µ)1/(1−θ). Hence total investment in each patent race is de-
creasing in the interest rate as well. Using this to explicit the expected value of
innovation (8), and substituting in (12) again, we obtain the equilibrium ﬂow
of investment per ﬁrm:
z(kj)=
 η(µ − η)




which is increasing in the quality achieved in the single sector, since this im-
plies higher demand and hence higher expected proﬁts for the corresponding
intermediate product, and increasing in the degree of returns to scale,  ,s i n c e
this makes investment more productive. For a given scale of production, in-
vestment is also increasing in the mark up µ, which is exactly the core of the
Schumpeterian idea that monopolistic proﬁts drive investment of single ﬁrms.12
Finally, the interest rate does not aﬀect the individual investment of ﬁrms, while
it negatively aﬀects the number of ﬁrms and hence the total investment. This
result is quite intriguing: any adjustment of R&D investment to variations in
the interest rate goes through changes in the number of ﬁrms, not in their size.
The decentralized equilibrium does not optimizes the allocation of invest-
ment across ﬁrms in the sense that it does not minimizes R&D expenditure for
a given probability of innovation. In particular, the investment per ﬁrm which
minimizes total expected costs (ﬁxed and variable) for a given probability of
11In the Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1995] model, the arbitrage equation for the patent race
kj pins down the investment in innovation in the patent race kj + 1 with a weak economic
intuition. Instead, here the free entry condition for the patent race kj pins down the number of
ﬁrms investing in innovation in the patent race kj and, together with their proﬁt maximising
choices, their individual investments in the same patent race kj.
12The eﬀect of higher ﬁxed costs on investment can be shown to be non monotonic, positive
for η low but negative for η high enough: on one side high ﬁxed costs reduce expected proﬁts
for a given life of the patent, but on the other, they reduce the innovation rate in the future








which is larger than (14) in absence of subsidization: in a decentralized equilib-
rium ﬁrms tend to choose ineﬃciently small investments. The intuition relies
on the fact that researchers do not internalize the eﬀect of their choices on the
entry decision, and entry creates wasteful duplication of R&D expenditures, in
terms of ﬁxed costs of research: hence, ceteris paribus, ﬁrms choose subopti-
mal investment. Since growth depends on the probability of innovation, the
equilibrium is dynamically ineﬃcient: the economy could achieve the same ag-
gregate probability of innovation investing a smaller amount of total resources
or increase the former at the same level of the latter. This leads to a crucial
property of the equilibrium organization of the R&D sector:
Proposition 1. Under Nash competition in the market for innovations,
the equilibrium implies a sub-optimal ﬂow of investment in R&D per ﬁrm and
dynamic ineﬃciency in the growth process.
This form of dynamic ineﬃciency is absent in traditional models of endoge-
nous growth, where the economy may grow above or below an optimal bench-
mark, but cannot increase the growth rate without giving up to some of the
current consumption: when marginal productivity in the R&D sector is decreas-
ing, the endogenous organization of this sector creates this ineﬃciency. Only a
proper R&D policy can solve it and, using (14) and(15), one can easily derive




µ(1 −  )+η 
∈ (0,1) (16)
which is always positive, decreasing in µ and increasing in η, since higher eﬀec-
tive markups already create larger investments.
On a balanced growth path with a constant interest rate, the resource con-
straint implies that income, investment and hence consumption must grow at
the same rate. Equating (2) and (11) and using the aggregate probability of
innovation common to all sectors and given by (13), we can derive all the equi-










γ +( 1− α)/αlnq
(17)
13Formally, if the investment ﬂow is βX(kj +1 )f o re a c hﬁrm, the eﬃcient organization
chooses β to minimize expenditure (β + η)X(kj + 1) for a given probability of innovation
[φ(kj)βX(kj +1 ) ]  . In the Appendix I show that the social planner solution results in the
same organization.
11As one could expect, the more costly are innovations (higher η and ζ), the lower
is equilibrium growth, while the relation between the monopolistic mark up µ
and growth has an inverted U-shape (but it is always positive for mark ups
below the monopolistic level). Finally, the relation between growth and   is
U-shaped.
The dynamic ineﬃciency of the growth process shows how a country with
an industrial structure characterized by small ﬁrms achieves ineﬃcient results,
and could grow more without losses in current consumption if its ﬁrms were
increasing in size. This general conclusion may shed new light on the problems
of countries that do not grow much and lack large and innovative corporations.
This is the case of many European countries, most notably of Italy, whose
industrial structure is characterized by a large number of small and medium
size enterprises whose innovative capacity is quite limited.14
The equilibrium arrival rate of innovations is directly proportional to the











1+αγ lnq/(1 − α)
(18)
hence higher size innovations are associated with higher growth but fewer ﬁrms
(and less frequent innovations).
Clearly, a social planner would choose the number of ﬁrms investing in R&D
and consequently the growth rate of the economy taking into account the social
value of innovations, rather than their private value, and in the Appendix I
show that in equilibrium both n and g are suboptimal at least for γ small
enough. This result has a simple intuition: when the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution is large (γ is low), it is optimal to choose a high growth rate of
consumption, hence the social value of innovations is high. On the other side, the
private value of innovations depends on market features which are independent
from consumers preferences (except for an indirect channel going through the
interest rate). Hence, for γ small enough, the social value of innovations is
higher than the private value and the optimal number of ﬁrms becomes larger
than the equilibrium one.
The optimal allocation of resources can be achieved with two policy tools
derived in the Appendix, a positive R&D subsidy, which optimally allocates
14The reasons for the lack of growth in the size of Italian ﬁrms have been usually associated
with credit rationing problems or with the family based structure of Italian capitalism, but
the endogenous tendency toward small innovative ﬁrms suggested here may be part of the
story (since R&D subsidization has been always limited in Italy compared to other western
countries). Not by chance, the Italian endogenous response to this problem (without proper
equivalents around the world) has been the delegation of innovative activities to “industrial
districts”, that is organizations of small ﬁrms investing in the same sector on a larger scale.
12resources between investors and an entry fee increasing the cost of entry, which
targets the optimal number of ﬁrms:15
Proposition 2. The optimal R&D policy requires a positive R&D subsidy to
investment and an entry fee (positive for γ large enough) to achieve the optimal
organization of the market for innovations and the optimal growth rate.
The message of this section is quite in contrast with the usual models of
Schumpeterian growth, where the optimal R&D policy may imply taxation or
subsidization of the R&D investment. When we take into account the organiza-
tion of the market for innovations, we obtain a more intuitive result, for which
innovating ﬁrms should always be subsidized to increase their size.
Before turning to a more realistic situation where incumbent monopolists
compete with the outsiders to innovate, I want to stress that this general equi-
librium model can be used for other interesting analysis, for instance to analyze
qualitatively the eﬀects of technological shocks on the investment in R&D.16
4 Growth Driven by Market Leaders
Many product innovations are due to dominant ﬁrms and a lot of the invest-
ment in R&D is actually done by both incumbent monopolists and new ﬁrms.17
Existing models about innovation and growth are inconsistent with this simple
fact, since under Nash competition and free entry, as we have seen also in the
previous section, an incumbent monopolist has no incentives to invest in R&D.
Recent research has rationalized investment of the incumbents in a partial
equilibrium framework showing that monopolists invest in R&D more than any
other ﬁrm as long as they are leaders in the sense of Stackelberg in markets for
15Only in the limiting case of constant returns to scale, which is the traditional focus of
this literature, the size and the number of ﬁrms do not matter and an R&D subsidy alone
can achieve optimality. Notice that approaching constant returns to scale in our model (that
is when   → 1a n dη → 0), the investment by each ﬁrm and the number of ﬁrms become
indeterminate, but the equilibrium growth rate converges to the traditional one (see Barro
and Sala-i-Martin [2004]): g →

µ/¯ ζ(1 − s) − ρ

/[γ +( 1− α)/αlnq].
16A temporary increase in TFP would increase production and wages in the short term.
Consumption smoothing implies that part of the increase in income is saved and market
clearing in the credit market requires that the interest rate goes down and investment in R&D
increases through entry of new ﬁrms in the R&D sector. Consumption jumps up and keeps
following the optimality condition (2), while income jumps up and then follows the dynamic
of (11), but the temporary reduction in the interest rate implies that initially output grows
more than consumption, creating a mechanism for the propagation of the shock.
17For empirical evidence on this classic Schumpeterian insight see for instance Blundell et
al. [1999], Nicholas [2003] and Segerstrom [2006].
13innovations where entry is free.18 Actually, this behaviour of the leaders under
free entry is a particular case of a much more general result established in Etro
[2002,a; 2006,b] where I have shown that Stackelberg leaders are always aggres-
sive (under quantity or price competition or in patent races as here) whenever
entry is endogenous. Here, the requirement that incumbents are leaders in the
market for innovations is realistic: after all, it is reasonable to imagine that they
have a credible commitment to invest a certain amount of resources to improve
their own products and protect their own rents. Otherwise, we can imagine that
incumbent monopolists can undertake some preliminary investments which af-
fect their proﬁtability from engaging in R&D activity, like building laboratories,
hiring researchers or borrowing to invest.19
Let us consider the market for innovation described in Section 2, where (9)
and (10) are the objective functions of the entrants and the leader, and the
latter has a ﬁrst mover advantage (for simplicity, I will abstract from subsidies).
In this set up, analyzed in more detail in the Appendix, the partial equilibrium
for each sector is characterized as follows:
Proposition 3. Under Stackelberg competition in the market for innova-
tions, when   is large enough incumbent monopolists deter entry obtaining com-
plete persistence of their leadership, while for smaller values of   they allow entry
but invest more than any outsider.
When marginal productivity is close to constant, that is for   close to 1, it
is optimal for the monopolist to deter entry investing just enough in R&D to
make unproﬁtable for any follower to engage in R&D activities, and this delivers
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(19)
where ¯ ψ is the return rate from leadership and is derived in the Appendix. This
return rate is above µ since it includes the value of perpetual leadership, but,
approaching constant returns to scale, it tends to µ:i ns u c hac a s et h eg r o w t h
rate approaches the same level as under Nash competition (the investment of
the incumbent monopolist perfectly crowds out that of the outsiders). In what
18See Etro [2004]. For related theoretical works, see Wiethaus [2005], Zigic et al. [2006],
Reksulak et al. [2006] and Denicol` o and Zanchettin [2006].
19As I have shown in a more general context (see Etro [2006a,b]), this kind of strategic
investment allows to reproduce similar outcomes to Stackelberg equilibria with free entry:
leaders always overinvest strategically to be aggressive in the market for innovations afterward.
See also Etro [2007] for a more general discussion on the link betweek the theory of market
leaders and policy issues.
14follows, however, I will focus on the more realistic scenario where entry by out-
siders takes place and the persistence of monopolies is only partial: this requires
that investment in R&D faces signiﬁcant decreasing marginal productivity, i.e.
  is small enough.20
When marginal productivity is decreasing (enough), the free entry condition
pins down the number of followers in each sector. In this case, it is easy to
verify that their optimal strategy z(kj) is always independent from the one
of the leader (while the number of followers decreases in the investment of the
leader), hence the eﬀective discount rate r+p(kj) must be also independent from
the leader’s strategy [Etro, 2004]. The leader chooses its investment zM(kj)t o
solve the problem (10), where the eﬀective discount rate is independent from its
choice and hence taken as given. From the ﬁrst order conditions of the leader
















N o t i c et h a tt h ei n v e s t m e n to fe a c hf o l l o w e ri si n c r e a s i n gi nt h ev a l u eo ft h e
leadership net of the ﬁxed cost, while the investment of the leader is independent
from the ﬁxed cost. The characterization of the equilibrium is complicated from
the fact that now we do not know what is the value of being a monopolist,
since this is the solution to the Bellman equation (10). But this value is what
drives the incentives to invest in innovation, that is the engine of growth. A
contribution of this paper is to provide dynamic programming techniques to
solve analytically this problem, which will emerge whenever one is dealing with
Schumpeterian models of growth where incumbent monopolists engage in R&D
activity - see also Segerstrom [2006]. To derive the balanced growth path and
the equilibrium value function VM(kj), the functions z(kj)a n dzM(kj)a n dt h e
equilibrium values for g, r, p and n, we can adopt the method of undetermined







where ψ is a coeﬃcient to be determined which can be interpreted as the rate
of return from leadership. This must be larger than µ, otherwise the value of
being a leader investing in R&D would be smaller than the value of being a
leader without investing (i.e.: it would be optimal to stay out of the patent race
20Segerstrom [2006] has criticized my approach for implying a low persistence of monopo-
lies. However, my approach is even consistent with complete persistence (for   high enough).
Nevertheless, in a realistic set up monopolies should be persistent, not eternal.
15for the leader). Substituting in (20), this implies:
z(kj)=
µ
 (ψ − η)












and, using this in the Bellman equation, we have:
VM(kj)=
[φ(kj)zM(kj)]
  VM(kj +1 )− zM(kj)
r + p





















whose right hand side contains the sum of the mark up from the current innova-
tion and another term which represents the option value of remaining monopolist
after the next innovation: this option value is positive because of the leadership
advantage. Using (21) and solving (23) for the eﬀe c t i v ed i s c o u n tr a t ew eh a v e :
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which provides a negative relation between the eﬀective discount rate r+p and
t h er a t eo fr e t u r nf r o ml e a d e r s h i pψ (for ψ small enough): the higher is the
eﬀective discount rate, the shorter is the lifetime of an innovation, and hence
the lower is the value from being a leader.
Moreover, the zero proﬁt condition for the followers provides another expres-
sion for the eﬀective discount rate which is analogous to (13):
r + p =
∙
 (ψ − η)
¯ ζ
¸  ∙




This is a positive relation between the eﬀective discount rate r +p and the rate
of return from leadership ψ: the higher is the value of being a leader, the larger
will be the investment in R&D and hence the probability of innovation and the
eﬀective discount rate.
Equating (24) and (25) we obtain the equilibrium value for ψ which provides
all the equilibrium relations. An implicit expression for ψ is given by:
ψ = µ +












Proposition 4. Under Stackelberg competition in the market for innova-
tions, the equilibrium rate of return from leadership is higher than under pure
Nash competition because of the option value of monopoly persistence.
16Using (25), this implies that the eﬀe c t i v ed i s c o u n tr a t ea n dh e n c eb o t ht h e
growth rate and the aggregate probability of innovation must be higher than
under Nash competition.2122 The incumbency advantage adds power to the
engine of growth because it endogenously increases the value of innovations as-
sociating with them an option to persistent leadership: this increases aggregate
investment and hence growth. Moreover, we can easily verify that both the
return from leadership ψ,t h ee ﬀective discount rate and hence the growth rate
are increasing in the mark up µ. A ni n c r e a s ei nt h eﬁxed cost of innovation
through η decreases the eﬀective discount rate and hence the growth rate of the
economy, but it has ambiguous eﬀects on the value of being a leader. Finally,
when innovations are more diﬃcult to obtain because of an increase in ζ,t h e
value of being a leader is unchanged, but the growth rate is ultimately reduced.
In conclusion, for   small enough, under Stackelberg competition in the market
for innovations, monopolists invest in R&D more than any outsider and the











γ +( 1− α)/αlnq
(27)
where ψ, given by (26), is decreasing in ζ and η, and increasing in µ,a n dw e
have:
Proposition 5. Under Stackelberg competition in the market for innova-
tions, the equilibrium growth rate is higher than under pure Nash competition.
Clearly, when the engine of growth is given by persistent monopolistic posi-
t i o n sa si nt h i sm o d e l ,t h ei n v e s t m e n tb ye a c hﬁrm increases, but it is still below
the optimal level for both the incumbent monopolists and the outsiders (see the
Appendix): the dynamic ineﬃciency is still present. It can be shown that the
optimal allocation of resources can be achieved with a positive subsidy for the
entrants, a smaller but positive subsidy for the incumbent monopolists and an
appropriate entry fee to discipline entry.23
In conclusion, a model of Schumpeterian growth which incorporates some
realistic features of the market for innovation like decreasing marginal produc-
tivity of investment, ﬁxed costs and a ﬁrst mover advantage for the incumbent
21This does not need to be the case when incumbents ﬁnd optimal to deter entry (that is
for high enough  ).
22Paradoxically, even if the rate of return from leadership is higher when growth is driven
by monopolists, one can easily verify that the equilibrium value of innovation is smaller. The
reason is that larger investments in R&D reduce the lifelenght of new intermediates.
23This is in contrast with the model of R&D investment by monopolists due to an exogenous
technological advantage by Segerstrom [2006], which delivers the optimality of a negative R&D
subsidy. This may show the importance of endogenizing monopoly persistence.
17monopolist, delivers realistic implications for the patterns of innovation. Mar-
ket leaders invest a lot in R&D and their leadership is somewhat persistent, but
sooner or later they are replaced by new entrants. This environment enhances
innovation and growth.
5 The Determinants of Growth
The above model can be used for a wide range of investigations on other de-
terminants of growth and the way policies aﬀect the internal mechanism of the
engine of growth. I will analyze a few in this Section. First, I will study the re-
lationship between growth due to other sources and growth due to innovations,
showing a new causal relation between them. Then, I will examine innovation in
a open economy context with trade and capital ﬂows showing that the outcome
is consistent with a number of features of the recent international experience.
Finally, I will study how inﬂation and price frictions aﬀe c tt h ee n g i n eo fg r o w t h ,
deriving a long run relation between inﬂation and growth. Each one of these
extensions has consequences for the empirical macroeconomic research which
could be analyzed in the future. For simplicity, I will conﬁn et h er e s to ft h e
analysis to the particular case with α = θ.
5.1 Innovation and growth
While a close attention has been paid to the eﬀects of investments in innovation
on growth, little interest has been captured by the opposite direction of causal-
ity: economic growth may aﬀect the incentives to invest in R&D. This appears
quite important for the empirical analysis on the determinants of growth (a se-
rious critique to Schumpeterian growth models relies on the absence of a clear
relation between R&D and growth) and also for growth accounting purposes.24
I will address this issue augmenting the previous models with an external source
of growth, which may just be the traditional exogenous technological progress
or it may be endogenized through accumulation of human capital, public capital
or other externalities increasing TFP. Then, I will evaluate the impact of this
other source of growth on the incentives to invest and ﬁnally derive the nature
of the relationship between overall growth and innovation. A surprising result
emerges: even when innovation is the main engine of growth (in the sense that
24See the pathbreaking work by Jones [1995] and the survey by Aghion and Howitt [1998,
Ch.12] on empirical tests of the Schumpeterian growth theory and Barro and Sala-i-Martin
[2004, Ch. 10] on its implications for growth accounting.
18it actually contributes to most of the growth rate), growth and investment in
innovation may be negatively correlated.
Assume that our parameter A grows at an exogenous rate x = ˙ A/A:e v e ni f
we refer to this as TFP, we may think of any source of growth which does not
derive from endogenous innovation. Now the expected discounted value of the










r + p(kj) − x
1−α
(28)
which is clearly increasing in x. Under this extension, the growth of output (5),
as a function of the new source of growth, can be derived as g(x)= ˙ Q/Q+x/(1−
α), where the rate of technological progress is still deﬁned by (11) but depends
on x as well. As before, one can easily derive the equilibrium organization of the
market for innovation under Nash or Stackelberg competition: now investment
by each ﬁrm increases over time at a constant rate, while the number of ﬁrms is
ﬁxed and endogenously depends on the new source of growth. On the balanced
growth path output must still grow at the same rate as consumption, which is
given by the Euler equation (2). Hence, the equilibrium growth rate can be
derived as:
g(x)=g(0) +
x(1 − α + αlnq)
(1 − α)(1 − α + γαlnq)
(29)
where g(0) is the growth rate in absence of other sources of growth (the same
derived in Section 3 or 4) and the right hand side is increasing in x.25 Finally,





(1 − α)(1 − α + γαlnq)
(30)
Hence, when γ<1, an increase in growth due to other factors than innovation
increases R&D investment: this happens through an increase in the number
of ﬁrms investing in research (while the investment per ﬁrm does not change).
However, when γ>1, the increase in growth reduces entry and total invest-
ment in innovation. This surprising result is due to the eﬀect of the endogenous
adjustment of the interest rate on the value of innovations (28). When out-
put growth increases, the interest rate must go up to raise savings and allow
consumption growth to increase as well. The increase in the interest rate has
25A similar result would emerge if we were considering population growth: as well known
from the last generation of endogenous growth models [Jones, 1995], per capita income growth
would increase with the growth rate of population.
19a negative aﬀect on the value of innovations and hence on entry of ﬁrms in-
vesting in R&D, and this negative eﬀect must be compared with the positive
direct eﬀect exerted by the increase in x on the value of innovation. When the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is high (γ is small), a small increase in
the interest rate is needed to clear the credit market and R&D investment un-
ambiguously increases, but when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is
low (γ is large), the opposite happens and an increase in x reduces investment
and technological progress. Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 6. An increase in the growth rate due to other factors than
innovation reduces (increases) the number of ﬁrms investing in innovation and
total investment in innovation when γ>(<)1.
When the paradoxical negative relation between other factors of growth and
innovation occurs, the empirical implications are quite drammatic: even if in-
vestment in innovation is the main engine of growth, the correlation between
growth and investment/GDP ratio should be negative. Since realistic values for
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution imply γ close to unity, we should not
be surprised to ﬁnd out that there is not a strong correlation between growth
and R&D investment. In general, future empirical research on the relation be-
tween R&D and growth should take seriously the feedback eﬀect of growth on
R&D activity: the absence of a positive correlation between growth and R&D
is not by itself a defeat of the Schumpeterian hypothesis.
5.2 Globalization and growth
In this section I will open up the economy to investigate how the engine of
growth works in an international context with trade frictions.26 Iw i l ls h o wt h a t
growth is driven by the largest economy and enhanced by its relative size and
by openness.
Let us consider two or more countries endowed with the same technology and
preferences as above, but diﬀerent TFP and population levels. Labour does not
move across countries and ﬁnal goods freely move across borders, while there
are frictions in trade of intermediates: imagine that for 1 unit of intermediate
good sent to a foreign country, d ≤ 1 units arrive at destination because of
iceberg transport costs or protectionism (but one may also think of losses due
to incomplete protection of foreign IPRs): the parameter d can be interpreted
as a measure of the degree of openness. These trade frictions imply that foreign
demand is smaller than domestic demand for each intermediate good produced
26See Grossman and Helpman [1991] on many related issues. In Etro [2005] I develop further
issues about R&D policy in the open economy framework sketched below. See also Impullitti
[2006a,b].
20at home, and the expected discounted value of the proﬁts with innovation kj by























When countries are homogeneous or market integration is perfect (d = 1), this
value is the same everywhere and the allocation of R&D investment is indeter-
minate. Otherwise, the value of innovations is higher for larger economies.27
As long as the productivity of the research eﬀorts is the same in all countries,
or higher in the larger ones, the endogenous allocation of R&D investment is
always biased toward the larger country: under Nash competition in the market
for innovations, only its ﬁrms will invest in R&D, while under Stackelberg com-
petition incumbent ﬁrms from other countries may keep investing and retain
the leadership, but they will loose it sooner or later in favour of ﬁrms from the
largest country. Hence, for any initial allocation of the technological frontier, the
engine of world growth is in the largest economy, which gradually conquers the
technological leadership in all sectors through its innovative ﬁrms. Historically,
a similar process realized during the XIX century with the Industrial Revolution
in England and in the XX century when USA became ﬁrst the largest world
economy and then gradually conquered the technological leadership in most sec-
tors; some observers would bet on China repeating this path during the XXI
century.
The world economy must be characterized by a constant growth rate for all
countries (diﬀerences would emerge reintroducing heterogeneity in TFP growth
across countries). Growth increases in the relative size of the leading country
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γ +( 1− α)/αlnq
(32)
Even if this model does not exhibit absolute scale eﬀects as in the last genera-
tion of endogenous growth models (since Jones [1995]), “relative scale eﬀects”
emerge: the larger is the leading economy compared to the rest of the world,
27This speciﬁcation is borrowed from Alesina and Barro [2002] who studied the relation
between the size of countries and unions and globalization - see also Etro [2006c]. Notice that
in case of diﬀerent growth rates of TFP and population across countries, we should take into
account the growth rates as well to compare country’sizes.









21the higher is the growth rate. A consequence of these relative scale eﬀects is
that the positive relation between openness and growth survives (see Barro and
Sala-i-Martin [2004], on the related empirical evidence).
The equilibrium is characterized by intra-industry trade: even if the largest
country has an absolute advantage in all sectors, it develops a comparative
advantage in the intermediate goods sector and exports these goods and imports
ﬁnal goods in the long run.29 Finally, notice that the world interest rate has to
equate world savings and investment, hence savings from all the world ﬁnance
investments in the leading country. This may help explaining the Lucas’paradox
concerning why capital does not ﬂy to poor countries, while often there is a ﬂow
of resources moving in the opposite direction. Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 7. In a open economy context with trade frictions, the largest
country has a comparative advantage in the innovation sector and, in the long
run, it leads alone the technological frontier, exports intermediate goods, imports
ﬁnal goods and attracts foreign capital to ﬁnance investment. Growth increases
in the degree of openness and in the relative size of the largest country.
Such an scenario may appear to extreme to be realistic, nevertheless, in a
stylized way, it appears in line with the growth experience of the last decades.
This was characterized by 1) large R&D investments and high rate of technolog-
ical progress in the US, 2) high US imports of ﬁnal goods which allowed other
countries to grow as well, exporting ﬁnal goods to the US and importing Amer-
ican technology, and by 3) impressive capital ﬂows toward the US ﬁnancing its
large current account deﬁcits and turning United States into the largest debtor
country in the world.
As in the closed economy, also this decentralized international equilibrium is
dynamically ineﬃcient and a system of R&D subsidies and entry fees would be
welfare improving. However, countries have conﬂicting interests. Since aggre-
gate growth depends on international factors, every single country has a limited
scope for intervening: shifting monopolistic proﬁts toward domestic ﬁrms. In a
more general context [Etro, 2002b], I have characterized the optimal unilateral
policies for international competition, which in our framework require posi-
tive R&D subsidies.30 Unfortunately, these policies just shift proﬁts from one
29At each point in time, the trade surplus in intermediate goods, national savings and net
capital inﬂows will have to be matched by a deﬁcit in trade of ﬁnal goods and by investments.
30More precisely, when the proﬁt function of the subsidized domestic ﬁrm satisﬁes strate-
gic complementarity, that is ∂2Πi/∂zi∂zf > 0, and marginal proﬁtability increasing in the
subsidy, that is ∂2Πi/∂zi∂s > 0, as here for (9) with the value of innovation (31), 1) under
barriers to entry there is always a unilateral incentive to tax the domestic ﬁrm (as well known
in the trade literature), but 2) under free entry there is always a unilateral incentive to subsi-
dize the domestic ﬁrm: this new result is derived in Etro [2002b] within a more general model
and our framework is nested in that one (for related works on marker leaders and trade policy
22country to another, crowding out investments by foreign ﬁrms in favour of the
domestic subsidized ﬁrm, while aggregate growth is unaﬀected. For instance,
under perfect market integration, the optimal R&D policy can be characterized
as in the closed economy, but the optimal unilateral R&D policy by a single
country (which maximizes proﬁts of the domestic ﬁrms net of the subsidy cost,
taking as given the world growth rate) is given by the following subsidy for any
domestic ﬁrm:
ˆ s =






[µ(1 − ε)+η ] −  η
∈ (0,1)
In conclusion, in the open economy context, independent R&D policies do not
promote growth,31 suggesting a new case for international cooperation.
5.3 Inﬂation and growth
Endogenous growth models are well equipped to face monetary issues in growing
economies, but they have been rarely used for this purpose. Here, building on an
important contribution by Barro and Tenreyro [2006], I show that an inverted-U
relation between inﬂation and long run growth emerges when monetary frictions
aﬀe c tt h ee n g i n eo fg r o w t h .
Consider a closed economy, and introduce real money balances M/P,w h e r e
M is nominal money issued at the growth rate σ = ˙ M/M and P is the price
level for the ﬁnal good, which is perfectly ﬂexible and evolves with the rate
of inﬂation π = ˙ P/P. Adopting the Sidrausky approach with money in the
utility function C1−γ/(1 − γ)+χ(M/P)1−ξ/(1 − ξ)w i t hξ,χ > 0, standard
optimization shows that the optimal consumption growth is still given by (2),
while money demand is M = P [χCγ/(r + π)]
1/ξ. Equating the latter and the
money supply delivers the equilibrium price level at each point in time. This
implies that on a balanced growth path the endogenous level of inﬂation is
constant if and only if:




In general equilibrium, monetary policy and hence inﬂation may aﬀect the return
rate and the growth rate. This is not the case when the prices of the intermediate
goods perfectly adjust to changes in the price level of ﬁnal goods: then inﬂation
see Boone et al. [2006] and Kovac and Zigic [2006]).
31One may wonder what would happen if all countries could optimally choose their R&D
policy. Contrary to what happens in usual trade wars, here a world Nash equilibrium would
be characterized by a limited number of countries choosing the subsidy ˆ s and all the other
countries choosing not to subsidize R&D, again without impact on economic growth.
23is superneutral. In such a case, the optimal monetary policy is always given
by a generalized Friedman Rule which sets the nominal interest rate as close as
possible to zero implying the optimal rate of money growth σ = gγ(1 − ξ)/ξ−ρ
(which is positive for γ small enough).
However, when prices of intermediate goods are sticky in the newkeyne-
sian tradition [Mankiw, 1985; Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 1987], new consequences
emerge for equilibrium growth and we will focus on them. Before doing it, how-
ever, notice that, as emphasized by Barro and Tenreyro [2006], a surprise inﬂa-
tion temporary increases demand of intermediate goods and hence production.
For instance under a price stabilization policy a discrete and permanent increase
in money supply (or a temporary increse in the growth rate of money) increase
the price level of ﬁnal goods and decrease the relative price of intermediate
goods (until ﬁrms change them), temporary boosting production. Moreover,
consumption smoothing implies that part of the increase in income is saved,
exerting a temporary downward pressure on the interest rate which, in turn,
promotes investment in R&D, creating a novel mechanism for the propagation
of the shock (compared to standard newkeynesian models).32 The eﬀect of inﬂa-
tion in such a model suggests problems of time-inconsistency for a policy of price
stabilization, as in the Barro-Gordon framework. However, our model generates
a good reason for commitment to rigorous monetary rules: the reason is that
inﬂation creates other eﬀects on investment and these eﬀects have permanent
consequences on long run growth.
There are many ways to formalize price stickiness. Following the newkey-
nesian literature [Woodford, 2003], it is convenient to assume staggered price-
setting ` al aCalvo, where the opportunity to adjust prices follows a stochastic
process for each ﬁrm. However, our model provides an easy and realistic way to
endogenize price adjustments assuming that they coincide with the introduction
of new goods in the market.33 In particular, an innovator at time τ sets the
p r i c eo fi t sg o o da tal e v e lPτ(1+µ) and keeps it at this level until a new vintage
is on the market with a new price. Then, the expected discounted value of the
32The qualitative analysis of these shocks is beyond the purpose of this paper. Nevertheless,
a brief summary of them can be interesting. At the time of the shock, the real interest rate
jumps down, while production and consumption jump up and new ﬁrms invest in R&D because
of the lower interest rate: this implies that the growth rate of income is above the growth rate
of consumption. While ﬁrms gradually change their prices, the impact of the shock vanishes:
the interest rate goes up toward the initial level, the growth rate of consumption increases
and the growth rate of income decreases, both slowly returning to the initial long run level.
33This is realistic if the average life-lenght of a product is short, that is if we are dealing
with small and frequent innovations in each industry. One can see this as an extreme form
of price stickiness, but we could obtain similar qualitative results when there is an exogenous
probability of price adjustment at the cost of analytical complications.








1−α L[(1 + µ)Pτ − Pt]e−[r+p(kj+1)](t−τ)
Pt
dt (34)
where Pt = Pτeπ(t−τ). Developing the integral, it can be veriﬁed that this value
is an inverted-U curve in the inﬂation rate and it is maximized at some level ˆ π,
which is positive if µ is large enough. Competition to innovate is driven by (34)
as before (even if ﬁrms now decide their real investment ﬂows and change the
nominal ones over time with inﬂation). Since the equilibrium eﬀective discount
rate, the aggregate investment and the growth rate of output are directly related
with this value of the intermediate goods (34) by the free entry condition in the
market for each innovation, they inherit the same non-monotonic relation with
inﬂation. Hence, price stickiness, generates an inverted-U curve linking the
inﬂation rate and the endogenous growth rate:34
g = g(π)w i t h g0(π) ≷ 0f o rπ ≶ ˆ π (35)
The balance growth path is characterized by (33) and (35) for a given policy of
constant money growth σ.35 Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 8. In presence of price stickyness, there is a long run inverted-
U relation between inﬂation and growth due to the eﬀects of expected inﬂation
on the incentives to invest.
Notice that this result is in contrast with the Mundell-Tobin eﬀect for which
inﬂation stimulates investment and growth: here, this happens only for low lev-
els of inﬂation, while high inﬂation erodes expected monopolistic proﬁts and
hence it reduces investment and growth. The last outcome may provide a chan-
nel for the negative relation between inﬂation and growth emphasized in the
empirical literature at least for high levels of inﬂation - see Barro and Sala-i-
Martin [2004].
34This eﬀect may be quite relevant. Imagine that prices are constant for a year, mark up is at
20% and inﬂation at 5%. Then, assuming α =0 .5, after one year the ﬂow of proﬁts is reduced
by more than 20%. If the average life-lenght of an intermediate good is one year (or prices
are changed every year), inﬂation reduces the value of innovation by about 10%. As in the
newkeynesian literature on businness cycles, small price frictions imply that demand shocks
can have large macroeconomic consequences: however, here the consequences are permanent.
35For intermediate levels of money growth there are two equilibrium growth paths and the
ineﬃcient one is characterized by high inﬂation and low growth. This self-fulﬁlling stagﬂation
has a simple intuition: if high inﬂation is expected, ﬁrms reduce investment decreasing output
growth, which generates a low growth rate of consumption and money demand, which creates
high inﬂation. However, such a path is unstable, and in what follows I focus on the stable
path.
25While the newkeynesian theory has mainly focused on the short term conse-
quences of inﬂa t i o ni np r e s e n c eo fp r i c ef r i c t i o n s, little attention has been paid
to the long run consequences, which can be even more important from a pol-
icy point of view. In our context, the utility maximizing policy can be quite
complex, but if proper policies can solve the ineﬃciencies in the allocation of
investment, the optimal inﬂation rate must be between the Friedman rule level
and the growth maximizing level. Clearly, when χ → 0, so that the welfare costs
from not implementing the Friedman rule under full price ﬂexibility are negligi-
ble, the optimal policy tends to the growth maximizing one. Interestingly, the
latter boils down to a policy of zero inﬂation when pricing strategies are opti-
mally chosen by monopolists. To see this, notice that the optimal monopolistic
mark up in sector j is:
µ =
(1 − α)[r + p(kj +1 ) ]
α[r + p(kj +1 )− π/(1 − α)]


















which is maximized by ˆ π = 0. If it is optimal to maximize the value of innovation
and growth, the associated optimal rate of monetary growth is σ∗ = γg(0)/ξ >
0. Hence in this case we can conclude that when χ → 0 the optimal policy
satisﬁes the Friedman rule under perfectly ﬂexible prices but it requires price
stabilization under sticky prices.36
For instance, an explicit solution for the long run growth rate as a function












which holds for small enough inﬂation and is clearly maximized by a policy of
price stabilization.
Finally, let us brieﬂy consider the open economy model of the previous sec-
tion. Purchasing power parity in the ﬁnal goods would imply that domestic
inﬂation is matched by depreciation of the home currency. Barro and Ten-
reyro [2006] have shown that in this environment inﬂationary surprises create
36Clearly, a characterization of optimal monetary policy is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, this framework allows to formalize in a new and simple way the long run welfare
costs of a positive inﬂation.
26temporary expansions and transmit them abroad as well. Our general equilib-
rium extension would allow to study the eﬀe c t so fs h o c k si nas i m p l ew a yi n
the tradition of the new open economy macroeconomics [Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ,
1996].37
More interesting for our purposes is to focus on the long run eﬀects of in-
ﬂation on growth for an open economy. These eﬀects depend on the country
we are looking at. In the leading economy with a comparative advantage in the
investment sector, inﬂation will impact on growth in a similar way to the closed
economy. However, in a small open economy whose growth rate depends on
foreign innovations, inﬂation does not aﬀect long run growth. Hence, in small
open economies there is a stronger case for unilateral inﬂationary surprises (or
unilateral competitive devaluations).
Even if here I focused on the relation between inﬂation and long run growth,
I would like to stress as a collateral result that this framework could be usefully
a d o p t e di nf u t u r er e s e a r c ha sas i m p l en e wo p e ne c o n o m ym o d e lw i t hs o m e
advantages over the Obstfeld-Rogoﬀ framework, which does not endogenize in-
vestment: this framework allows to take investment into the (current) account.
6 Conclusions
I developed a model of creative destruction where the engine of growth is in
the microeconomic structure of the patent races leading to innovations. In con-
clusion, I want to summarize the most substantial ﬁndings of this research.
Exploring a realistic organization of the market for innovations we found a new
source of dynamic ineﬃciency of the growth process which is due to subopti-
mal investment by both incumbent patentholders and outside researchers and
requires R&D subsidies as a general remedy. Moreover we have shown in a
quite general framework that an increase in growth due to other sources than
37It is tempting to summarize quickly the eﬀects of the same positive monetary shock
as before in this open economy context. Domestic expected income increases and foreign
expected income increases as well, but relatively less in case of trade frictions. The domestic
exchange rate depreciates (but less than proportionally because of the relative increase in
domestic money demand) and domestic and foreign savings increase. This implies that the
international interest rate goes down until world investment increases enough to match world
savings: hence, the temporary monetary shock boosts production and investment in the world
economy. The current account surplus improves for small countries, but it deteriorates for
the larger country (where investment takes place), contrary to what happens in the Mundell-
Fleming and in the Obstfeld-Rogoﬀ models. The diﬀerence with the latter derives from the
absence of an investment channel for the propagation of the shock in the basic Obstfeld-Rogoﬀ
framework (where all short term eﬀects go through intertemporal substitution in consumption
and labour supply).
27innovation can reduce the investment in R&D generating a negative correlation
between growth and innovation. We also noticed that in a open economy con-
text growth is driven by the largest country and increases with its relative size
and with openness. Finally, in a monetary context price stickiness induces an
inverted U relation between inﬂation and long run growth. Future empirical
research may investigate some of these ﬁndings.
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Appendix
The Social Planner Solution. I derive the optimal organization of the R&D
sector through an heuristic solution for the social planner problem. First of all, it is
immediate to derive from the concavity of the arrival rate that it is optimal to allocate
equal ﬂows of investment between all the R&D laboratories. Consider linear invest-
ment ﬂows in the future scale of production, as z(kj)=βX(kj +1 )=βq
θ
1−θX(kj)
for each ﬁrm in sector j, where the paremeter β must be chosen optimally. Let us
keep the production of intermediates at the level chosen by the monopolist in the de-
centralized equilibrium. As well known, a social planner would not distort the choice
of the input mix, hence we are basically solving for a second best allocation (the ﬁrst
best allocation would be obtained by subsidizing monopolists in such a way that their
price equates marginal cost).
The resource constraint of the economy must take into account the ﬁxed costs,
which are paid only at the beginning of each new patent race. Without loss of gen-
erality, let us assume that the economy devotes a ﬂow of resources for this purpose
in each sector. If the number of sectors N is high enough, one can approximate this
ﬂows, say fj(kj) with those equating their expected present value fj(kj)/[r + p(kj)]
to the ﬁxed cost F(kj),t h a ti sw i t hfj(kj)=ηX(kj +1 ) . Using the expressions

























from which we derive an expression for consumption holding at each point in time. Un-
















Given a constant growth rate of consumption, intertemporal utility is ﬁnite as long as












(1 − γ)[ρ − (1 − γ)g]
(39)






















which puts in clear evidence the basic trade-oﬀs. A higher number of ﬁrms or a higher
ﬂow of investment per ﬁrm imply a higher growth rate of consumption but with a lower
initial consumption level (and the time preference rate and the elasticity of substitution
govern this trade-oﬀ in a standard fashion), but the weights on beneﬁts and costs are
diﬀerent for the two choice variables. The higher is the ﬁxed cost parameter η the
more costly is to increase the number of ﬁrms rather than the ﬂow of investment,
while the opposite happens when the parameter ζ, which determines the arrival rate
of innovations, is higher. Finally, also the size of the innovations q and the parameter
θ characterizing the elasticity of demand of intermediate goods inﬂuence the trade-oﬀ.
If an interior solution exists, the ﬁrst order conditions for the social planner
problem (40) with respect to β and n can be divided one by the other to obtain
β∗ =  η/(1 −  ), which implies the optimal ﬂow of investment in R&D per ﬁrm (15)
in the text. Let us now look at the number of ﬁrms investing in R&D. From the ﬁrst























which is decreasing in   at least for   high enough: this implies that when the marginal
productivity of the investment is high enough, it is optimal to have just one laboratory
investing in R&D. Finally, substituting β∗ and n∗ in our expression for growth (38),






















38It can be veriﬁed that when A grows at the rate x, the optimal allocation of
investment per ﬁrm is unchanged and the number of ﬁrms increases (decreases) in x
for γ<(>)1.
31which is higher than the equilibrium growth rate for any γ smaller than a cut-oﬀ
(and tends to the Barro and Sala-i-Martin optimal growth rate approaching constant
returns to scale, that is for   → 1 and η → 0). To derive the optimal R&D policy let
us introduce an entry fee which is the fraction τ of expected production costs in each










γ +( 1− α)/αlnq
(43)
The optimal R&D policy is given by (s∗,τ∗) such that z(k) and g(s,τ) equate z∗(kj)




η+τ∗(1 −  )+ 
∈ (0,1) (44)
τ∗ =



























which provide two unique optimal policy tools. Clearly g∗ <g (s,0) for γ high enough,
in which case, the optimal entry fee is positive.
Growth driven by Market Leaders. I will now provide further details on the
model with Stackelberg leadership for patentholders in the R&D sector. When there
is entry of ﬁrms in the patent races, the equilibrium eﬀective discount rate derived in
the text allows to explicit the growth rate as:
g =
r + p − ρ
γ +( 1− α)/αlnq
(46)
a n dt h e nt od e r i v et h en u m b e ro fﬁrms n( ) as a function of   and the equilibrium
investments:
z(kj)=
 η (ψ − η)


















which are both smaller than the ﬁrst best level. Also in this case, the organization
of the investment is dynamically ineﬃcient. Eﬃciency would require z(kj)=zM(kj)
and hence (ψ − η)/(1 − s)=ψ/(1 − sM),w h e r es is the subsidy for the followers








ψ(1 −  )+η 
∈ (0,s ∗) (47)
The investment of the monopolist is increasing with   and actually converging to ∞
for   → 1. This implies that there is a cut-oﬀ ˆ   such that n(ˆ  )=1 .T h e n , f o r
  ≥ ˆ   the optimal strategy for the leader is pure entry deterrence - this applies a
more general result by Etro [2002,a]. To derive the equilibrium under this regime
of complete persistence of monopoly, notice that the investment of the leader must
be slightly above the level at which the free entry condition allows entry by just one
follower. Such an investment allows the leader to be alone in the patent race and,
adopting the usual guess for the value function (21), it implies:









Using the equilibrium expression for the growth rate of consumption (2) and income
(46), this provides:















which is a standard positive relation between the probability of innovation and the
return from leadership. Since the leader is alone in the patent race, the probability
of innovation is simply p =[ φ(kj)zM(kj)]
 , which implies zM(kj)=p(1/ )/φ(kj).
Now the Bellman equation expressing the value of leadership becomes:
VM(kj)=
[φ(kj)zM(kj)]
  VM(kj +1 )− zM(kj)
r + p


















which, using the guess value for VM(kj),p r o v i d e s :
ψ =
"


















whose denominator must be positive under the transversality condition ρ>(1 − γ)g,
which requires γ large enough. This implies a negative relationship between the prob-
ability of innovation and the return from leadership due to the entry deterrence con-
straint: the larger is the investment in R&D needed to deter entry, the smaller is the
value of being a leader. The two conditions above deﬁne the equilibrium values for
ψ = ¯ ψ and the aggregate probability of innovation and hence the interest rate, the
eﬀective discount rate and the growth rate (19) in the text. In general, the leader is
33investing just enough to deter entry, while it could marginally reduce its investment
and allow entry by one follower, which would increase the aggregate probability of in-
novation, the eﬀective discount rate, and hence also the growth rate (this implies that
in the regime of entry deterrence, the equilibrium growth rate could be below the one
emerging without leaderships). However, approaching constant marginal productivity,
the return from leadership ¯ ψ tends to µ and:
gb →1,η→0=
µ/¯ ζ − ρ
γ +( 1− α)/αlnq
(49)
which is the same growth rate as under Nash competition in the market for innovations:
when   =1the incumbent monopolist is actually indiﬀerent between investing in R&D
and crowding out outsiders’ investment or not investing at all (with no changes in the
aggregate equilibrium variables).
34